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Abstract 
The existing literature on social dilemmas has demonstrated that personal values and 
situational cues often interact to predict cooperative decisions in social dilemma tasks. 
We propose, however, that whether or not situational cues, such as the framing of the task 
or perceptions of others involved, effectively motivate decision-makers to act upon their 
values is ultimately influenced by whether or not decision-makers identify with the other 
parties involved. This notion of identification seems particularly pertinent when a social 
dilemma task involves parties from diverse national backgrounds.  Across two studies, 
participants living in the United States of America completed an online global public 
goods game in which personal values were measured and situational factors were 
manipulated.  Specifically, in Study 1 (N = 299), we manipulated the framing of the 
decision-making task (moral vs. economic) and identification with ethnically diverse 
others (high vs. low).  We found that the relationship between personal moral values and 
global cooperation was strengthened when identification with ethnically diverse others 
was high compared to low but only when the task was framed in moral terms.  In Study 2 
(N = 356), we manipulated the perceived need of the international group members 
involved in the task (high vs. low) and identification with ethnically diverse others (high 
vs. low).  We found that the relationship between personal moral values and global 
cooperation was strengthened when identification with ethnically diverse others was high 
compared to low but only when the perceived need of others was high.  Overall, these 
results underscore the integral role of identification in determining whether or not moral 
values are enacted in the presence of morally-relevant cues.  
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Introduction 
 Globalization is certainly not a new phenomenon, but the recent rapid increase in 
globalization has aroused much controversy over its consequences.  Increases in global 
trade, communication, migration and travel have been linked to substantial economic, 
political, and cultural growth across the globe.  For example, the capacity for 
international trade allows for the specialization of trade between countries, which 
improves the economy and standard of living for those involved (Baker & Lawson, 
2002).  However, despite the apparent benefits of globalization, such interdependence has 
also received much criticism.  The specialization of trade may ultimately benefit local 
and national economies in the long run, but working toward these eventual gains often 
entails immediate costs.  In the United States, for example, unemployed Americans and 
economists alike protest that outsourcing jobs to other nations has taken away jobs from 
and lowered the wages of our own citizens (Madrick, 2004). 
 Globalization has major costs and benefits, and much of the controversy 
surrounding globalization is based on disagreement between economic theories and 
conflicting interpretations of facts (e.g., Bitros, 2013).  However, another important and 
psychologically meaningful conflict that contributes to the controversy is a conflict of 
interest regarding whose well-being and outcome one is concerned with.  In other words, 
an individual’s sentiment regarding globalization is likely to be considerably influenced 
by whether she values outcomes for the self, her nation, and/or the world as a whole.  An 
individual who is primarily concerned with the outcomes of her nation over others’, for 
example, would not be swayed to favor an action due to its apparent benefit to other 
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nations; instead, the benefits to her nation in particular must outweigh the costs.  On the 
other hand, if an individual is concerned with the outcomes of people in all nations, then 
she may support an act that benefits all others even at her personal and her nation’s 
expense.  Thus, an individual may come to support globalization if the target of her 
interest is transformed.  For example, people may be more inclined to support cross-
boundary cooperation if they are concerned with the outcomes of all people, and not just 
the self or the parochial group (Buchan, Brewer, Grimalda, Wilson, Fatas & Foddy, 
2011). 
 The debate over globalization presents us with a real-life social dilemma—people 
may choose to protest globalization in order to improve their nation’s immediate welfare 
over others, or they may choose to support globalization in order to benefit other nations 
in addition to or perhaps over their own.  In the social dilemmas literature, it is important 
to note that much of the research involves cooperation within small groups of strangers, 
and little is known about the factors that influence decision-making in larger groups that 
represent diverse national groups.  Importantly, increasing people’s identification with a 
group has been shown to be an influential situational factor that increases cooperation 
with the relevant group (see Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 2002 for a review); however, the 
manipulation of group identification may not necessarily function similarly to the other 
aforementioned situational factors.  Specifically, whereas certain situational factors (e.g., 
task-framing, perceived need) may activate a moral mindset or make personal moral 
values salient, increasing group identification does not necessarily activate a mindset or 
values; instead, it may indicate that the people one is interacting with are the people 
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toward whom their values should be enacted.  In other words, some situational factors 
may indeed activate our values, but ultimately, whether or not we act upon those values 
toward others depends on whether or not we identify with them. 
Indeed, scholars have argued that moral values may only be applied to people that 
a decision-maker includes within her moral community.  Different people at different 
times may vary in who they include within a moral community, with the boundaries 
extending from very local (e.g., family, neighborhood) to intermediate (e.g., nation) to 
global (e.g., all humans, all species; Bandura, 1990; Deutsch, 1985).  Thus, although 
much of the existing literature has examined the congruency between personal values, 
situational factors, and behavior within parochial groups, it is possible that moral values 
and morally-relevant situational cues may not lead to corresponding prosocial behavior if 
other parties involved are not included within the decision-maker’s perceived moral 
community (e.g., if they are ethnically diverse people with whom the decision maker 
does not identify).  Thus, we propose that relevant situational factors will motivate people 
to act upon their moral values (i.e., behave generously) with people from foreign nations 
only if their identification with ethnically diverse others is made salient.  
Moral Values 
 In the present work, we are particularly interested in how personal and situational 
factors interact to predict behavior in a global social dilemma.  A social dilemma is a 
situation in which an individual must decide whether to behave selfishly or cooperatively 
in a group task, and the situation is structured such that every group member would 
benefit from their own and others’ cooperation, but the individual benefits the most by 
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acting selfishly when others act cooperatively.  Experimental games that model social 
dilemmas serve as valuable tools for research in the area of moral psychology because 
they present people with situations in which they could act prosocially and benefit others, 
or act selfishly and potentially take advantage of others’ prosociality.  The broad purpose 
of the present work is to investigate the factors that influence whether or not people 
choose to behave prosocially in a social dilemma situation that includes group members 
from diverse international backgrounds.  
 Much of the past literature on individual factors in social dilemmas demonstrates 
that people’s values—for example, their social value orientation (SVO)—can have a 
considerable influence on their behavior in social dilemmas (see Balliet et al., 2009 for a 
review).  SVO is defined as an individual’s enduring preference for a particular pattern of 
outcomes (e.g., in the division of resources) for the self vis-à-vis others (Messick & 
McClintock, 1968).  The literature on SVO categorizes people into two broad categories: 
proself versus prosocial.  Proselfs may be further divided into two subcategories: 
individualists and competitors. Individualists seek to maximize their own absolute 
outcome regardless of others’ outcomes, whereas competitors seek to maximize their 
relative outcome compared to others’ outcomes.  On the other hand, prosocials seek to 
maximize joint outcomes between the self and others.  Furthermore, a very small 
subgroup of prosocials is comprised of altruists, who seek to maximize the outcomes of 
others regardless of their own personal outcomes.  An individual’s SVO can be 
determined using the decomposed games procedure, in which an individual indicates his 
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preferred allocation of points between himself and another hypothetical individual 
(Messick & McClintock, 1968).   
 As an illustrative example, Liebrand and Van Run (1985) proposed that SVO 
predicts conservation behavior with respect to a limited resource.  To measure SVO, 
participants completed two decomposed game procedures.  Participants were then placed 
in seven-person groups and engaged in a sequence dilemma task, which was explained in 
terms of an energy conservation crisis.  Across several stages, each participant decided 
how much energy he or she would individually consume (in dollar amounts) from an 
energy resource (pool of money) that is shared among the group members.  Participants 
were informed that they would be paid the amount of money they took for themselves, 
but if the total amount taken by all of the group members exceeded the pool size, then 
each member would receive nothing.  Results revealed that altruists took the least amount 
of money for themselves, followed by the cooperators (i.e., those who prefer equally 
good outcomes for self and other), then the individualists, and lastly the competitors who 
took the largest amount of money.   
 Researchers have further evaluated the relationship between SVO and behavior in 
social dilemmas by investigating the differences between prosocials and proselfs 
regarding their personal values and goals (e.g., De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001; Garling, 
2010).  For example, De Cremer and Van Lange (2001) posited that prosocials’ tendency 
to behave cooperatively is linked to their feelings of social responsibility and/or goal of 
reciprocity.  In their first study, they first measured participants’ SVO using decomposed 
game procedures and categorized participants as either prosocial or proself.  Participants 
7 
 
were placed in groups of four and engaged in a one-trial public goods dilemma.  In this 
task, each participant received a number of points and was given the choice to contribute 
any amount of their points to a group account.  The total amount contributed by the group 
would be multiplied by two and split equally among all members of the group, regardless 
of their contribution.  Thus, the payoff was structured such that contributions to the group 
account enhanced the outcome of all group members, but an individual’s non-
contribution would result in the greatest possible outcome for that individual.  Just prior 
to making their contribution decision, participants report the extent to which they felt it 
was their responsibility to further the collective interest.  The results of this study 
revealed that participants with a prosocial SVO were indeed more likely to report feeling 
that it was their responsibility to further the collective interest and more likely to 
contribute points to the group account compared to people with a proself SVO.   
 In De Cremer and Van Lange’s (2001) second study, SVO was measured using 
the same procedures as in their first study.  After participants completed self-reported 
measures of social responsibility, participants then engaged in a modified public goods 
dilemma.  In this task, the general payoff structure was that of a typical public goods 
paradigm, and each participant engaged with a single ostensible partner.  On a single 
trial, each participant was given five choices of contributions to their partner, and these 
five choices varied systematically from most cooperative to least cooperative.  After 
participants received feedback regarding their partners’ choice (high cooperation versus 
low cooperation), participants then made their choice of contributions. Results revealed 
that when partners’ cooperation was low, both prosocials and proselfs were relatively 
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uncooperative, but when partners’ cooperation was high, prosocials were significantly 
more cooperative than proselfs.  Furthermore, the effect of SVO on contributions was 
partly accounted for by feelings of social responsibility.  Prosocials were also more likely 
to mirror their partners’ behavior compared to proselfs; importantly, however, feelings of 
social responsibility did not account for this pattern of reciprocal behavior. 
 Overall, the literature suggests that the relationship between SVO and behavior in 
social dilemmas is linked to personal values and goals, and De Cremer and Van Lange 
(2001) demonstrated that prosocials are indeed more motivated by feelings of social 
responsibility than proselfs, but they are also sensitive to others’ behavior such that they 
tend to mirror the behavior of involved parties.  This work suggests that not only are 
prosocials interested in enhancing the collective interest, but they also appear to value 
reciprocity or equality in outcomes.  However, given that reciprocity was measured 
behaviorally, it remains unclear whether or not prosocials actually value the achievement 
of reciprocity as a moral virtue.   
 Haidt (2008) defines morality as comprised of “interlocking sets of values, 
practices, institutions, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to 
regulate selfishness”.  Thus, whether or not an individual’s reciprocal behavior was a 
function of her moral values would depend on whether the behavior was motivated by 
desires to regulate selfish behavior or not.  Specifically, reciprocal behavior may be based 
on values of equality or fairness, which is identified as a moral value (Haidt, 2007); 
however, it is also possible that the same prosocial behavior measured by SVO and 
reciprocal behavior exhibited in De Cremer and Van Lange’s (2001) work could be based 
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on compliance with group norms (Kerr, 1995) rather than valuing it per se. It might also 
be self-protective in certain cases; reciprocating defection ensures that one is not “the 
sucker.” Thus, the motivations for reciprocity remain open to investigation. 
In the present work, we are interested in evaluating the effects of moral values per 
se on prosocial behavior in social dilemmas.  As such, rather than assessing SVO, which 
indexes preferences for particular outcomes, we measured individual differences in 
prosocial or other-oriented personality.  This is indexed with a scale known as the 
Prosocial Personality Battery (Penner, Fritzsche, Craiger, & Freifield, 1995), which 
measures a collection of moral values regarding one’s sentiment toward others, such as a 
concern for others’ welfare, justice, and social responsibility.    
Contextual Factors 
 There are a large number of contextual factors that have been shown to influence 
decisions in social dilemma situations.  For current purposes, we will focus on two that 
appear to activate a moral mindset: The way in which the dilemma decisions are framed, 
and the level of need exhibited by other parties in the interaction. 
 The task frame.  Across multiple studies, the manner in which a decision-making 
task is framed has been shown to influence whether or not people behave cooperatively 
or selfishly with other group members involved in the task (see Levin, Schneider & 
Gaeth, 1998 for a review).  For example, Pillutla and Chen (1999) directly evaluated the 
effect of decision framing on people’s behavior and expectations in social dilemmas.  The 
authors proposed that framing a task as economic versus noneconomic would influence 
whether individuals cooperate.  To examine this, all participants were asked to “invest in 
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a joint investment fund” (economic context) and to “contribute to a social event” 
(noneconomic context) in two separate games.  Half of the participants were presented 
with the economic context first, and the remaining half of the participants were presented 
with the noneconomic context first.  After deciding how much to contribute in the first 
context, they received competitive feedback (all other members contributed nothing), 
cooperative feedback (all other members contributed everything), or no feedback from 
their group.  Participants reported the extent to which the behavior of the group was 
expected, and they subsequently made their second decision in the alternate context.  
Results revealed that overall participants contributed more in the noneconomic task 
compared to the economic task even though the contingencies of the decision (i.e., risks 
and payoffs) were identical across the two framings.  Furthermore, participants who 
received competitive feedback after the noneconomic task decreased their contribution in 
the following task significantly more than participants who received competitive 
feedback after the economic task.  Participants also rated competitive feedback after the 
noneconomic task as more unexpected than cooperative feedback.  These results suggest 
that people indeed hold beliefs about what kind of behavior is appropriate in certain 
situations, and framing a task as one in which cooperation is appropriate increases 
cooperative behavior. 
 The perceived need of others.  The social dilemmas literature has also 
demonstrated that experiencing empathy for others in need of help increases prosocial 
behavior (e.g., Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson, Batson, Todd, Brummett, Beverly, Shaw, 
& Aldeguer, 1995; Batson & Moran, 1999); indeed, an individual’s feelings toward 
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others may influence his or her behavior regardless of how the task is framed.  Batson 
and Shaw (1991) investigated the link between empathy and altruism, and they posited 
that the path between empathy and altruistic behavior begins with perceiving another 
person as in need, and if the perceiver takes on the perspective of the other in need, the 
perceiver will experience empathy and consequently behave altruistically toward the 
other.  For example, Batson & Moran (1999) proposed that people are more inclined to 
behave altruistically toward an individual with whom they are interacting when they take 
on the perspective of the individual compared to when they remain emotionally distant.  
In their study, participants engaged in a one-trial prisoner’s dilemma with an ostensible 
partner.  The task involved exchanging cards that were worth the gain or loss of raffle 
tickets for a prize, and the task was either framed as a “Social Exchange Study” (social-
frame condition) or “Business Transaction Study” (business-frame condition).  The 
participant and their ostensible partner had to decide whether to give a gain card (i.e., 
cooperate) or a loss card (i.e., defect) to each other.  The payoff was structured such that 
if both parties gave a loss card to each other, then each party would receive 5 raffle 
tickets; if both parties gave a gain card to each other, then each party would receive 15 
raffle tickets; but if one party gave a loss card and the other party gave a gain card, the 
former would receive 25 raffle tickets and the latter would receive 0 raffle tickets.  Thus, 
as in a typical prisoner’s dilemma, both parties would receive a greater outcome if both 
cooperated than if both defected, but each individual would receive the greatest possible 
outcome if his/her partner cooperated and he/she defected.  Before making their decision, 
participants were provided information about their ostensible partner’s recent life 
12 
 
events—specifically, the partner shared that he/she recently ended a romantic relationship 
and was very distraught over the breakup.  Participants were instructed to either remain 
objective (low-empathy condition) or take on the perspective of their partner (high-
empathy condition).  The results revealed that participants in the high-empathy condition 
were more likely to cooperate than participants in the low-empathy condition in both the 
social-frame and business-frame conditions; furthermore, among participants in the low-
empathy condition, participants were less likely to cooperate in the business-frame 
condition than participants in the social-frame condition.   
 Overall, these results suggest that both the framing of the task and the perception 
of the other’s need provide key cues for behavior, and furthermore, framing a task in 
economic terms does not hinder the effect of taking on the perspective of others in 
distress.  This work demonstrates that even in a task that typically inhibits prosocial 
behavior, perceiving others as in need of help may activate a “moral mindset” and 
motivate an individual to act prosocially toward those in need. 
The Interaction of Values and Situational Cues 
 Research suggests that individual values do not consistently predict behavior; 
instead, the effect of values is often moderated by situational factors (De Cremer & Van 
Vugt, 1999; Packer et al., in prep; Weber & Murnighan, 2008; Weber, Kopelmann & 
Messick, 2004).  According to Weber et al.’s (2004) logic of appropriateness framework, 
an individual determines whether or not cooperating with others is appropriate given his 
personal values, as well as the context of the task.  Thus, one limitation of studies like 
Liebrand and Van Run’s (1985) previously mentioned work on the effects of SVO on 
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cooperation in social dilemmas is that participants are often explicitly informed that they 
are engaging in a morally relevant task – e.g., an energy conservation task.  This presents 
participants with a situation in which prosocial behavior may be deemed appropriate.  In 
that previous study, for example, the authors found that participants with prosocial SVO 
were more cooperative than people with proself SVO; however, to the extent that people 
with prosocial SVO are more concerned with the collective interest, they may have been 
particularly sensitive to conservation cues compared to people with proself SVO.  It is 
possible that these prosocial individuals behaved cooperatively because they perceived 
the situation to be one in which their cooperation was appropriate. 
 Overall, the literature suggests that situational factors often provide a specific 
context in which certain behavior may or may not be deemed appropriate.  For example, 
Packer et al. (in prep) propose that certain situational cues (e.g., the presence of a moral 
exemplar) can activate an individual’s moral values, which subsequently fosters moral 
behavior.  However, in the absence of such cues, an individual’s values may remain 
inactive.  In their studies, participants played a public goods game with three computer-
simulated players.  Across a series of trials, each player was given an allotment of points, 
and on each trial, the players had to decide whether they would keep the allotment for the 
self (i.e., defect) or contribute it to the group account (i.e., cooperate).  All of the points 
contributed to the group account were doubled and distributed equally among all of the 
players; thus, the payoff was structured such that every player would receive a better 
outcome if everyone cooperated than if everyone defected, but each individual player 
would receive the greatest possible outcome if the other players cooperated and he/she 
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defected.  Participants were either placed in the condition in which a moral exemplar—
i.e., a consistent contributor (CC)—was present (CC condition) or condition in which a 
moral exemplar was not present (control condition).  In the CC condition, one computer-
simulated player (the CC) consistently cooperated with the group on every trial, and the 
remaining two computer players cooperated on some of the trials and defected on others.  
In the control conditions, all three computer players cooperated on some of the trials and 
defected on others.  Additionally, participants completed the Prosocial Personality 
Battery (Penner et al., 1995) as a measure of their moral values. The results revealed that 
participants who strongly endorsed moral values were significantly more likely to 
cooperate than participants who did not endorse moral values, but only in the CC 
condition and not in the control condition—i.e., only when a moral exemplar was present 
in the group.  These results provide further evidence for the influence of context on the 
activation and enactment of moral values. Given such results, it is clearly important to 
elucidate the interactive effects of personal and situational factors on behavior.   
 Based on prior literature, then, one might derive the predictions that personal 
moral values are more likely to predict giving to international others both when 
globalization is framed in moral terms rather than economic terms, and when the global 
others are perceived as impoverished and in need of help rather than as affluent and self-
sufficient.  However, we propose that these predictions would not be supported because 
we also know from prior literature that moral values only tend to be enacted toward 
targets who fall within the scope of one’s moral community (see Deutsch, 1985 for a 
review).  For many people, the moral community only includes members of relatively 
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narrow ingroups, such family, friends, neighbors, and perhaps nation; often, the moral 
community does not include people living in distant, unfamiliar nations.  Thus, we expect 
that an additional crucial moderating factor in the context of global social dilemmas will 
be identification with ethnically diverse others, such that we will only observe the 
interactive person-by-situation effects on generous behavior if identification with 
ethnically diverse others is heightened.  
Group Identification 
 The salience of a group identity has been studied as yet another influential 
situational factor on decision-making in social dilemmas, and a great deal of research 
illustrates that, overall, people tend to behave more prosocially toward fellow group 
members when a shared group identity is made salient (see Ellemers et al., 2002 for a 
review).  However, the influence of group identification is not necessarily uniform across 
individuals, and its effect on behavior may be moderated by personal factors.  For 
example, De Cremer and Van Vugt (1999) evaluated the interactive effects of group 
identification and SVO on behavior in a social dilemma.  They hypothesized that group 
identification increases cooperation with a group because it either 1) increases the value 
assigned to the collective good (i.e., goal-transformation hypothesis) or 2) enhances a 
sense of trust that others will reciprocate cooperation (i.e., goal-amplification hypothesis).  
They predicted that if the former hypothesis is true, proselfs would be more cooperative 
when their group identity is high compared to low because their sense of identity would 
be transformed from self-focused to group-focused, whereas prosocials would be 
cooperative across identity conditions because their sense of identity is consistently 
16 
 
group-focused.  On the other hand, if the latter hypothesis is true, prosocials would be 
more cooperative when their group identity is high compared to low because their goal is 
to achieve mutual cooperation and increasing trust increases the expectation of 
reciprocity, whereas proselfs would be uncooperative across identity conditions because 
they are not concerned with reciprocity.   
 De Cremer and Van Vugt (1999) conducted three studies in which participants 
played a public goods game for a monetary payoff.  The researchers manipulated levels 
of identification by telling participants that either the contributions of their group would 
be compared to the contributions of student groups at other universities (high group 
identification) or that their individual contributions would be compared to students’ 
contributions in general (low group identification). The results revealed that, overall, 
participants contributed more when group identification was high compared to low, and 
when identification was high, prosocials and proselfs did not differ in their contributions.  
Importantly, the proselfs contributed significantly more when group identification was 
high compared to low, whereas prosocials contributed consistently across identification 
levels.  Thus, the findings were consistent with the goal-transformation hypothesis such 
that identifying with a group transforms people’s identity and consequent behavior from 
self-focused to group-focused.   
 However, group identification does not always foster prosocial behavior.  At 
times, identification with an ingroup results in increased derogation of and discrimination 
against outgroup members (see Ellemers et al., 2002 for a review).  It appears that people 
are relatively selective about whom they help or cooperate with—i.e., the scope of their 
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moral behavior may be largely determined by their salient group identity.  Thus, to the 
extent that people are motivated to preserve the ingroup identity or to benefit only 
ingroup members, increasing group identification results in prosocial behavior toward the 
ingroup but antisocial behavior toward the outgroup (Billig & Tajfel, 2006).  
Furthermore, by stripping away the human characteristics of others and conceptualizing 
them as members of a “subhuman” category, people become tolerant and even supportive 
of the immoral treatment of the dehumanized group (Bandura, 1990). 
 The human tendency toward ingroup favoritism may have deep evolutionary roots 
(De Waal, 2006); as such, preservation of and loyalty to ingroups are sometimes 
perceived as morally righteous (Haidt & Graham, 2007).  Indeed, attempts to abolish the 
existence of ingroups versus outgroups would likely be ineffective and imprudent given 
that strengthening group identification often fosters prosocial behavior toward ingroup 
members (see Ellemers et al., 2002 for a review).  Thus, given that the scope of one’s 
morality lies within the ingroup boundary, one way to reduce the derogation and 
mistreatment of others would be to “humanize” the typically excluded others (Bandura, 
1990) and extend the boundary of the ingroup to encompass all people (McFarland et al., 
2012; Gaertner et al., 1993).  In other words, instead of attempting to eliminate the 
concept of an ingroup, we may foster prosocial behavior toward all humans by both 
expanding the boundary of and strengthening the salience of a global group identity. 
 It is important to highlight that much of the existing literature on identification in 
social dilemmas focuses on identification with relatively narrow group identities (e.g., 
collegiate or national identity).  However, in one recent study, Buchan et al. (2011) 
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evaluated the influence of global social identity (GSI) and cooperation in the context of a 
global collective.  The authors proposed that GSI transforms people’s goals from 
parochially-focused to globally-focused, which motivates cooperation beyond parochial 
groups.  In their study, participants played a public goods game, and they had to decide 
whether they would allocate their resources to their personal account, the national 
account, or the “world” account.  Contributing to either the local or world account would 
result in the multiplication and distribution of contributed resources among the players, 
and the factors by which the contributions were multiplied and divided were greater for 
the global account (X3) than the local account (X2).  The payoff structure was designed 
such that one’s contribution to the local account could potentially result in a greater 
payoff than was possible with the personal account (if many others also contributed to the 
local account, too), but there was a risk of losing resources with the former decision.  
Similarly, one’s contribution to the world account could potentially result in an even 
greater payoff than was possible with the local account (if many others contributed to the 
global account, too), but there was an even greater risk of losing more resources with the 
former decision.  After participants made their allocation decision, they completed a 
three-item GSI measure in which they indicated their attachment to, self-definition as, 
and perceived closeness with members of the world as a whole.  The results revealed that 
GSI significantly predicted contributions to the world account, and this effect was 
independent of participants’ expectations about others’ cooperation.  This suggests that 
GSI does not increase cooperation via increased trust but instead via the transformation 
of goals from parochially-focused to globally-focused. 
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 However, Buchan et al.’s data were correlational, and more direct evidence is 
needed regarding a causal link between expansive social identification and global 
cooperation.  More recent literature has shed light on the positive impact of human 
identity, which has been shown to be a distinct construct from other correlates of 
prosocial behavior, such as empathy, moral reasoning, moral identity, and universalism 
(McFarland et al., 2012).  McFarland et al. evaluated the effect of human identification 
on feelings and behavior toward humanity.  In their studies, participants completed the 
Identification with All Humanity Scale (IWAH) in which participants responded to nine 
items regarding the strength of their human identity; e.g., participants indicated the extent 
to which they care when bad things happen to people all over the world.  Scoring of the 
IWAH scale involves taking into account the strength of human identity vis-à-vis 
community identity and national identity. Across several studies, IWAH predicted 
various measures of humanitarian beliefs, such as concern for global human rights.  For 
example, in one study, participants were asked to indicate their preferences for policies 
that resulted in specific patterns of gains or losses for an outgroup versus the ingroup; 
e.g., one policy entailed the loss of outgroup (i.e., Afghani) lives against an economic 
loss for the ingroup.  The results revealed that IWAH was significantly negatively 
correlated with preferential treatment of the ingroup, which suggests that people who 
identify strongly with humanity exhibit decreased ingroup bias.   
 In addition to predicting humanitarian beliefs and emotions, McFarland et al. 
illustrated that human identification also predicts generous behavior toward people from 
foreign nations.  In one study, the authors directly evaluated the effect of human 
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identification on donation behavior.  They presented three samples of participants with an 
excerpt describing a natural disaster in another country, and participants were informed 
that they could donate any amount of their winnings from a drawing to relief for the 
disaster (i.e., UNICEF).  The results revealed that identification with humanity 
consistently predicted donating to UNICEF, whereas identification with community and 
identification with Americans did not consistently predict donating.  These findings 
suggest that the human identity plays a unique and integral role for fostering prosociality 
toward people across group boundaries.  However, in McFarland et al.’s study, certain 
situational cues are likely to have influenced participants’ behavior; specifically, among 
people who value the welfare of others, perceiving others as in dire need of help may 
have placed the individuals in a mindset in which generous behavior was deemed 
appropriate. Thus, for the present work, we posit that it is important to consider how the 
perception of the task and the people involved interacts with group identification to 
predict behavior. 
 Bandura (1990) posited that “humanizing” others via the affirmation of a common 
humanity effectively decreases immoral treatment of others, and existing research 
suggests that exposure to shared human values across diverse cultures indeed decreases 
perceptions of group differentiation and increases positive feelings toward all of 
humanity  (e.g., Luke & Maio, 2009).  Similarly, both positive and negative shared 
human experiences (SHE) increase feelings of similarity with others.  For example, 
Motyl et al. (2011) evaluated the influence of shared human experiences (SHE) on 
perceptions of outgroup members.  Specifically, they evaluated whether or not exposure 
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to SHE would attenuate the effect of mortality salience (MS) on negativity toward 
outgroups.  Research suggests that increasing the salience of a person’s mortality 
temporarily increases their bias against and negative reactions toward outgroups (e.g., 
Harmon-Jones, Greenberg, Solomon & Simon, 1996). Motyl et al. proposed that priming 
SHE would eliminate this bias-enhancing effect of MS. Across three studies, they 
manipulated MS by asking participants to answer open-ended questions about death (MS 
condition) or dental pain (control condition).  The researchers primed SHE by providing 
some participants with examples of SHE among people of diverse cultures (e.g., a story 
about the childhood experience of an international student), whereas participants in the 
comparison (control) conditions were provided similar stimuli but with American 
characters.  Participants were then asked a number of questions regarding their feelings 
toward outgroups (i.e., Arabs and immigrants).  The results revealed that participants in 
the SHE condition perceived their own culture as more similar to other cultures than 
participants in the comparison condition.  Furthermore, MS increased implicit anti-Arab 
prejudice, elevated anti-immigration attitudes, and reduced support for peace making 
actions in the comparison conditions, but only in the control conditions and not in the 
SHE conditions.  In light of the recent literature on human identification, it appears that 
exposure to cross-cultural SHE may increase identification with humanity, which in turn 
increases positivity and reduces negativity toward outgroup members.  
 Overall, the existing literature on identification with humanity suggests that 
valuing the lives of people from all nations is directly linked to prosocial emotions and 
behavior toward international others.  It appears that the affirmation of a common 
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humanity via the exposure to shared human experiences among ethnically diverse people 
may effectively increase prosociality toward such groups of people.  The purpose of the 
present work is to illustrate the importance of identification with ethnically diverse others 
for the enactment of moral values toward people from foreign nations in the context of a 
global social dilemma task. 
Moral Activation and Group Identification 
 Although the salience of a group identity has been studied as yet another 
influential factor for decision-making among previously mentioned situational factors 
(i.e., task-framing, perception of need), it appears to play a distinct and critical role that 
operates differently from other situational factors; specifically, the level of group 
identification may be crucial in determining whom we bestow generosity upon.  Again, 
this is distinct from simply an activation of values because the group identity is not 
strictly a cue that the situation is one in which the enactment of moral values is 
appropriate, but instead, it arguably acts as a cue that the identified-with group members 
are people toward whom one should enact moral values—i.e., people that one should feel 
concerned for. Taken together, prior literature supports a prediction that situational 
factors activate personal moral values, increasing the extent to which those values predict 
moral behavior in social dilemmas. The important argument here is that the exhibition of 
such moral behavior may further depend on whether one has a sense of identification 
with the other parties in the social dilemma. In other words, providing a context in which 
moral behavior is appropriate may indeed activate an individual’s moral values, but the 
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individual is only likely to act upon these values if the people he or she is interacting with 
are perceived to lie within his or her moral community. 
 The purpose of the present work is to examine how manipulating identification 
with an international group influences the individual’s behavior toward members of a 
global group (i.e., citizens of other nations).  For our first study, we investigated whether 
or not the interaction of personal moral values and the framing of the decision-making 
task depended on the level of group identification when predicting generous behavior in a 
global social dilemma.  Specifically, we hypothesized that moral values would more 
strongly predict increased global cooperation when a task was framed in moral terms 
compared to economic terms, but only among people who identified with ethnically 
diverse others.  
 Additionally, it is important to highlight that an “international group” may be 
quite diverse and include people from various cultures, socioeconomic backgrounds, etc.  
As suggested by existing literature, people may or may not deem cooperation with a 
global group as appropriate depending on how they perceive the group members.  Thus, 
for our second study, we investigated whether or not the interaction of personal moral 
values and the perceived need of the global group members depended on the level of 
group identification when predicting generous behavior in a global social dilemma.  
Specifically, we hypothesized that moral values would more strongly predict increased 
global cooperation when global others were perceived as high in need compared to low in 
need, but only among those who identified with ethnically diverse others.  
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Study 1 
 In Study 1, we tested the interaction between moral values, task framing, and 
identification with ethnically diverse others on contributive behavior in a multilevel 
public goods game.  Based on previous research (e.g., Packer et al., in prep), we 
hypothesized that there would be a relatively weak relationship between moral values and 
behavior among participants playing an economic version of the task.  Furthermore, we 
anticipated that this would be true regardless of level of identification – when moral 
values are not seen as relevant to decisions, it does not matter who is in the moral 
community/ingroup.  In contrast, we expected that moral values would be more 
predictive of behavior among participants playing a moral version of the task, but that 
moral behavior would tend to be extended more readily to participants within the moral 
community/ingroup. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 307 male and female adults who completed an 
online survey via Mechanical Turk for a payment of $1.00.  All of the participants lived 
in the United States of America.  Given that the manipulation for identification used in 
this study involved a priming task, participants who took exceptionally more time to 
complete the study were excluded from our analyses.  Specifically, eight participants 
were excluded for completing the study in over 3 standard deviations above the average 
completion time (M = 20.8 min, SD = 8.3), resulting in a total of 299 (152 F) participants 
included in the analyses.  The mean age of participants was 32.35 years (SD = 10.88), 
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85% of participants were Caucasian, and 56% of all participants reported belonging in the 
middle to upper socioeconomic class. 
Procedure. 
Identification with ethnically diverse people.  Participants completed two 
ostensibly unrelated tasks.  The first task was designed to manipulate identification with 
ethnically diverse others via assimilation vs. differentiation in relation to people from 
foreign cultures.   In order to obscure the genuine purpose of this manipulation, 
participants were informed that the purpose of this first task was to investigate people’s 
cognitive capacity to create novel thoughts about images they observe.  Participants 
viewed eight photographs depicting people from various cultures (e.g., African, Asian, 
Latin American) engaging in shared human experiences (e.g., dancing, playing sports).  
Participants were asked to list either similarities (high ID condition) or differences (low 
ID condition) that they noticed between the self and the people in the photographs as 
quickly as possible; specifically, for each photograph, participants read, “List one 
similarity (difference) between yourself and the people in the photograph” and typed their 
response in a text box. 
Global Public Goods Game. The second task involved the public goods game 
derived from the work of Buchan et al. (2011).  Participants were informed that they 
would complete an unrelated study that involved an online game, and that this game was 
a “Resource Allocation Task” about globalization.   Participants were provided 
information regarding the definition and benefits of globalization either framed in 
economic terms (economic frame condition) or in moral terms (moral frame condition).  
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For example, in the moral frame condition, globalization was defined as “the process of 
extending and enhancing social relationships between nations, so that goods, people and 
ideas flow smoothly between different nations” and as having the capacity to “create 
stable prosperity in impoverished nations,” etc. (see complete description in Appendix 
A).  Participants were further informed that they would be participating in this task with 
actual participants who had signed in online remotely, and that all of the participants 
lived in one of the following nations: Argentina, Bangladesh, Canada, South Africa, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States of America. Participants were informed that they 
would participate in this task with participants from their own nation and from two 
randomly selected other nations from the provided list, and that each nation would be 
represented by four participants.  Participants were not told which specific nations the 
other participants lived in—as such, each nation in the game was identified with a letter 
(e.g., Nation A).  In actuality, the ostensible “other participants” were computer-
simulated players. 
 Participants were informed that they would be given virtual money and must 
decide how to allocate this money.  They were provided instructions for the decision-
making task and payoff structure for their decisions.  In this task, participants were 
presented with 12 successive trials, and on each trial, each participant was given $100.  
On each trial, participants could allocate the $100 to one of three accounts: their personal 
(individual) account, their national account, or the world account.   
 Money placed in the personal account was guaranteed to count toward the 
individual’s payoff—i.e., if the individual allocated $100 to his/her personal account on a 
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given trial, he/she would keep that $100.  Players living in the same nation also shared a 
national account, and each of the three nations had its own national account. Importantly, 
players were only able to contribute to and receive a share of money from their own 
national account.  Thus, the individual participant and 3 other ostensible players from the 
same nation shared one national account, and the ostensible players from the two other 
nations had their own independent national accounts, providing a total of three distinct 
national accounts.  Any money placed in the national account by each player was doubled 
and distributed equally among all of the players from the same nation.  Players from all 
nations also shared a world account, and all players could contribute to and receive a 
share of money from the world account.  Any money placed in the world account by each 
player was tripled and distributed equally among all 12 players (including the participant) 
from all three nations.   
 The payoffs were structured such that on any given trial, if the individual placed 
his/her $100 in the personal account, he/she would receive a larger return relative to the 
national or the world account.   The return to each individual for each dollar placed in the 
national account and the world account—the marginal per capita return (MPCR)—was 
0.5 and 0.25 respectively; however, the return to the group for each dollar placed in the 
national account and the world account—the marginal social return (MSR)—was 2 and 3 
respectively (Buchan et al., 2011).  In other words, the best outcomes for individuals 
occurred when they allocated money to their personal account and others allocated to the 
national account or world account.  The best outcomes for members in a nation occurred 
when members allocated to their national account but members of other nations allocated 
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to the world account.  However, the best overall outcomes for everyone as a whole 
occurred when people from all nations allocated to the world account. 
 After receiving the instructions for the game, participants completed one practice 
trial and were provided information about their payoff on this example trial (see example 
in Appendix B).  Participants then proceeded to engage in the resource allocation task 
with the other ostensible players.  After each trial, participants received feedback 
displaying all of the players’ decisions (including their own; as in Appendix B).  In 
actuality, the decisions of the computer-simulated players were fixed, and each computer-
simulated player placed $100 into their personal, national, and world account on an equal 
number of trials across the 12 trials (i.e., 4 times into each account), in a random order. 
 Questionnaire measures.  After completing the game, participants then 
completed a questionnaire.  This questionnaire included measures of prosocial values, 
moral identification, and identification with humanity.  All scales are included in 
Appendix C.  
 Prosocial values.  Three Prosocial Personality Battery (PPB; Penner et al., 1995) 
subscales were used to assess moral values—specifically, the Social Responsibility (PPB-
SR), Other-Oriented Moral Reasoning (PPB-OMR), and Mutual Concerns Moral 
Reasoning (PPB-MMR) subscales were included.  Participants read several statements 
and rated each statement using a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree).  
An example statement is “I would feel obligated to do a favor for someone who needed 
it, even though they had not shown gratitude for past favors.” 
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Moral identification.  The Moral Identification – Fairness (MID-F; created by the 
author and her colleagues) and Moral Identification – Generosity (MID-G; created by the 
author and her colleagues) scales were used to assess the participant’s commitment to the 
values of fairness and generosity respectively.  Participants read several statements and 
rated each statement using a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree).  
Example statements are “I feel committed to being fair and acting based on principles of 
justice” (MID-F) and “I feel committed to being a generous and giving person” (MID-G). 
 Identification with humanity.  As a manipulation check for the identification 
manipulation, four items were created to assess participants’ human group identification 
(HID).  Participants read four statements and rated each statement using a 5-point scale (1 
= strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree).  An example statement is “I feel a sense of 
connection with all humans.”  The Identification with All Humanity Scale (IWAH) was 
also used to assess identification with humanity.  Participants read several statements and 
rated each statement for the following groups independently: people in one’s community, 
Americans, and people all over the world.  For example, participants were asked, “How 
close do you feel to each of the following groups?” and rated this using a 5-point scale (1 
= not at all close, 5 = very close). 
Results and Discussion 
 Identification with humanity.  As a manipulation check for identification with 
ethnically diverse others, hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to test the 
effects of ID (low vs. high) and task-frame (economic vs. moral) on participants’ HID 
scores (M = 3.99, SD = 0.64, α = 0.77).  The results revealed a significant main effect of 
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ID (β = 0.132, p < 0.05); specifically, participants in the high ID condition had higher 
HID scores on average than compared to participants in the low ID condition – indicating 
that the manipulation successfully increased a sense of identification with humanity via 
assimilation with ethnically diverse others.  There was also a significant main effect of 
task-frame (β = 0.18, p < 0.05); specifically, participants in the moral frame condition 
had higher HID scores on average than compared to participants in the economic frame 
condition.  The two-way interaction was not significant.  Additionally, hierarchical 
regression analyses were conducted to test the effects of ID and task-frame on 
participants’ IWAH scores1 (M = 3.25, SD = 0.83, α = 0.92).  The results revealed a 
marginal effect of task-frame (β = 0.093, p = 0.108) such that participants in the moral 
frame condition had higher IWAH scores on average compared to participants in the 
economic frame condition.  The main effect of ID and interaction between ID and task-
frame on IWAH scores were not significant.   
 These results suggest that both the ID manipulation and the task-frame 
manipulation increase a sense of identification with people all over the world.  Although 
the effect of task-frame was not predicted, it appears that framing the task in moral terms 
(i.e., globalization improves impoverished nations) also made the interconnectedness of 
humans salient, which consequently increased identification with people all over the 
                                                        
1 As per McFarland et al.’s suggested scoring procedure, IWAH scores were calculated as the 
residuals for participants’ IWAH scores on items regarding people all over the world with the items 
regarding people in one’s community and Americans removed.  Utilizing raw IWAH scores (M = 3.25, 
SD = 0.83, α = 0.92) for the items regarding people all over the world resulted in a similar pattern of 
effects.  Specifically, there was a significant main effect of task-frame (β = 0.205, p < 0.001), and the 
main effect of ID and interaction between ID and task-frame on IWAH scores were not significant.   
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world.  Interpretations of these results will be discussed in context of the behavioral 
results below.  
 Contributive behavior.  Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to test 
the interaction between participants’ moral values, ID, and task-frame on participants’ 
contributions to the world account.  The PPB-SR, PPB-MMR, and MID-F variables were 
combined to create a single moral values (MV) variable, (M = 3.8, SD = 0.48, α = 0.86).2  
The results revealed a significant main effect of MV on contributing to the world 
account, β = 0.290, p < 0.001.  Specifically, MV predicted global cooperation, such that 
people with strong MV were more likely to contribute to the world account than 
compared to people with weaker MV.  However, this main effect was qualified by the 
predicted three-way interaction between MV, ID, and task-frame, β = 0.122, p < 0.05.  
No other main effects or interactions were significant.   
 To decompose the three-way interaction, hierarchical regression analyses were 
conducted to test the two-way interaction between MV and ID on contributing to the 
world account within each task-frame condition.  As hypothesized, the results revealed a 
                                                        
2  We conducted a principal-components factor analysis of these items and found that the three items 
loaded onto a single component with all loadings over 0.67.  Furthermore, we conducted hierarchical 
regression analyses for PPB-SR, PPB-MMR and MID-F independently and found the same pattern of 
effects as with the combined MV variable.  Specifically, results revealed marginal interactions 
between PPB-SR, ID and task-frame (β = 0.097, p = 0.091), PPB-MMR, ID and task-frame (β = 0.104, p 
= 0.066), and MID-F, ID and task-frame, β = 0.102, p = 0.086.  We also found a marginal interaction 
between PPB-OMR, ID and task-frame (β = 0.083, p = 0.144), and the interaction between MID-G, ID 
and task-frame was not significant (β = 0.017, p = 0.777).  There was a significant main effect of PPB-
OMR (β = 0.302, p < 0.001) and a marginal main effect of MID-G (β = 0.115, p = 0.052).  Inclusion of 
these variables with the MV variables weakened the aforementioned 3-way interaction.  It appears 
that the PPB-OMR and MID-G variables do not exhibit the same pattern of effects as the MV variables 
because of their considerable main effect on behavior.  In other words, PPB-OMR and MID-G predict 
increased contributions to the world account regardless of the condition.  Given that all measures of 
moral values do not necessarily measure the same construct, the PPB-OMR and MID-G items were 
excluded from the analyses and combined PPB-SR, PPB-MMR and MID-F into the aggregate MV 
variable for our analyses.   
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significant interaction between MV and ID among participants in the moral frame 
condition (β = 0.171, p < 0.05) but not in the economic frame condition, β = -0.066, p = 
0.426 (see Figure 1).  Analysis of the simple slopes revealed that among participants in 
the economic frame condition, MV significantly predicted contributing to the world 
account in the low ID condition (β = 0.285, p < 0.01) but not the high ID condition, β = 
0.152, p = 0.253. However, as predicted, these slopes were not significantly different 
from each other, indicating that identification with ethnically diverse others did not 
influence whether or not participants enacted their moral values with international people 
because the situation was not one in which moral values had been activated.  In contrast, 
among participants in the moral frame condition, MV weakly predicted contributing to 
the world account in the low ID condition (β = 0.178, p < 0.1), but strongly predicted 
contributing in the high ID condition, β = 0.514, p < 0.001.  The fact that thinking about 
similarities (vs. differences) with ethnically diverse others enhanced the value-behavior 
relationship is consistent with our prediction that a moral task framing is most likely to 
energize value-congruent behavior toward others who are perceived as part of the same 
group.  
Additionally, we tested for the differences in the correlation coefficients of MV 
and contributing to the world account between the moral frame/high ID condition and the 
remaining three conditions independently.  As hypothesized, the results revealed that the 
correlation coefficients of MV and contributing to the world account in the moral 
frame/high ID condition, r(70) = 0.49, p < 0.001, and moral frame/low ID condition, 
r(71) = 0.18, p = 0.121, were significantly different from each other, z = 2.09, p < 0.05.  
33 
 
The correlation coefficients of MV and contributing to the world account in the moral 
frame/high ID condition and economic frame/high ID condition, r(74) = 0.13, p = 0.272, 
were also significantly different from each other, z = 2.44, p < 0.05.  However, the 
correlation coefficients of MV and contributing to the world account in the moral 
frame/high ID condition and economic frame/low ID condition, r(80) = 0.31, p < 0.01, 
were not significantly different from each other, z = 1.33, p = 0.183, although the 
difference was in the expected direction—i.e., the correlation was higher in the moral 
frame/high ID condition compared to the economic frame/low ID condition.  
Overall, although MV significantly predicted global cooperation in the economic 
frame/low ID condition (contrary to our predictions), MV were more weakly related to 
global cooperation in this condition compared to the moral frame/high ID condition.  The 
fact that the slope in the economic frame/low ID condition is significant and the 
economic frame/high ID condition is not significant may simply be noise (i.e., there was 
no ID X MV interaction in that condition).  Importantly, the overall pattern of effects is 
consistent with our hypothesis that the interaction of the moral frame and identification 
with ethnically diverse others strengthens the relationship between MV and global 
cooperation, whereas the economic frame and/or low identification weakens the 
relationship. 
Study 2 
 In Study 1, consistent with our hypotheses, we found that moral values were more 
predictive of contributing to the world account when the task was framed in moral terms 
compared to economic terms but only when identification with diverse others was high.  
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For Study 2, we investigated whether we would see a similar pattern of effects when the 
perceived need of the global group members was manipulated instead; specifically, 
would moral values predict global cooperation toward needy others (who should activate 
a moral mindset) more strongly when human identification is high rather than low?  
Would human identification matter when the others are not needy?  
 In Study 2, we tested the interaction between moral values, the perceived need of 
the global group members, and identification with ethnically diverse others on 
contributive behavior in a multilevel public goods game.  Based on previous research 
(e.g., Batson & Moran, 1999; McFarland et al., 2012), we hypothesized that there would 
be a relatively weak relationship between moral values and behavior among participants 
playing with people from nations that are perceived to be in little need of help.  
Furthermore, we anticipated that this would be true regardless of level of identification – 
when moral values are not relevant to decisions, it does not matter who is in the moral 
community/ingroup.  In contrast, we expected that moral values would be more 
predictive of behavior among participants playing with people from nations that are 
perceived to be in greater need of help, and that this would be especially true when the 
global others were perceived as falling within the moral community/ingroup (i.e., high 
ID). 
Method 
 Participants.  Participants were 362 male and female adults who completed an 
online survey via Mechanical Turk for a payment of $1.00.  All of the participants lived 
in the United States of America.  As in Study 1, given that the manipulation for 
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identification used in this study involved a priming task, participants who took 
exceptionally more time to complete the study were excluded from our analyses.  
Specifically, six participants were excluded for completing the study in over 3 standard 
deviations above the average completion time (M = 23.05 min, SD = 23.95
3
), resulting in 
a total of 356 (143 F) participants included in the analyses.  The mean age of participants 
was 34.93 years (SD = 11.9), 80% of participants were Caucasian, and 51% of all 
participants reported belonging in the middle to upper socioeconomic class. 
 Procedure.  
 Identification with ethnically diverse people. The same ID manipulation and 
procedure from Study 1 was used in Study 2. 
 Global Public Goods Game. The experimental paradigm for the decision-making 
task was largely the same as in Study 1.  In Study 2, participants were provided the same 
instructions for the Resource Allocation Task as in Study 1, except for the following 
three changes: 1) the task was not framed in terms of globalization and participants did 
not receive any information regarding globalization; instead, participants read that they 
would simply be “participating in a resource allocation task with people from various 
nations”; 2) participants were informed that all of the participants lived in one of the 
following nations: Argentina, Cambodia, Haiti, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
States of America; 3) participants were told which nations the fellow players lived in at 
the start of the game and after every trial when they received feedback regarding the 
players’ decisions; specifically, participants were informed that the players were either 
                                                        
3 The mean time and standard deviation were largely skewed by a single participant with a 
completion time of 450 minutes. 
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from Cambodia, The U.S.A., and Haiti (high PN condition) or from Switzerland, The 
U.S.A., and Sweden (low PN condition)
4
. 
 Questionnaire measures. After completing the game, participants then completed 
a questionnaire.  This questionnaire included the same measures of prosocial values, 
moral identification, and identification with humanity used in Study 1, as well as a 
measure of perceptions of other nations. 
 Perceptions of other nations.  Questions assessing participants’ perception of the 
two other nations they engaged with during the resource allocation task were included as 
a manipulation check for PN.  Specifically, participants were asked questions regarding 
the perceived need of the other nations (i.e., how impoverished participants thought the 
others were, and how much help the participants thought the others need) and relationship 
between the United States of America and the other nations (i.e., how they would 
characterize the relationship between the U.S.A. and the other nations; see all items in 
Appendix D).  All items were rated using a 5-point scale (e.g., 1 = not at all, 5 = 
extremely). 
                                                        
4 To choose the nations for the PN conditions, we conducted a pilot study (N = 58) in order to 
determine people’s perceived need of the other nations.  Participants were asked to rate 12 nations 
that were either developing (e.g., Haiti) or developed (e.g., Sweden) on how impoverished or “in 
need” they thought the citizens of each nation were using a 5-point scale (1 = not at all, 5 = 
extremely).  We conducted paired samples t-tests to determine which countries were the most 
different in terms of perceived need.  Results showed that Haiti was the most different from Sweden 
(t = 13.75, p < 0.001) and Switzerland (t = 11.72, p < 0.001), followed by Cambodia as different from 
Sweden (t = 9.87, p < 0.001) and Switzerland (t = 8.98, p < 0.001), such that Haiti and Cambodia were 
perceived as in greater need than Sweden and Switzerland.  Additionally, in order to control for 
preferential biases, participants were also asked to rate the 12 nations on how they characterized the 
relationship between the U.S.A. and each nation using a 5-point scale (1 = strong enemies, 5 = strong 
allies).  We conducted paired samples t-tests to determine which countries were the least different in 
terms of perceived relationship.  Results revealed that all of the ratings between the developing and 
developed nations were marginally or significantly different (all p’s < 0.12), suggesting that 
developed nations tended to be perceived as allies to the U.S.A. moreso than did developing nations. 
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Results and Discussion 
 Identification with humanity.  As a manipulation check for ID, hierarchical 
regression analyses were conducted to test the effects of ID (low vs. high) and PN (low 
vs. high) on participants’ HID scores (M = 4.08, SD = 0.64, α = 0.82).  Unlike in Study 1, 
the results revealed no significant main effects or interaction. Additionally, hierarchical 
regression analyses were conducted to test the effects of ID and PN on participants 
IWAH scores (M = 3.27, SD = 0.81, α = 0.91).  The results revealed a very weak effect of 
PN (β = 0.08, p = 0.134) such that participants in the high PN condition had slightly 
higher IWAH scores on average as compared to participants in the low PN condition.  
The main effect of ID and interaction between ID and PN on IWAH scores were not 
significant.   
 The results suggest that the ID manipulation did not increase a sense of 
identification with all of humanity, at least as indexed by these scales.  The manipulation 
utilized in the present work primed identification by asking participants to list similarities 
that they notice between others and the self.  However, it is important to note that group 
identification involves more than just perceived similarities among group members, and 
includes other components such as a sense of solidarity, commitment to the group, shared 
understanding, and so on (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Tajfel, Billig & Bundy, 1971).  Thus, 
to the extent that our manipulation may have only primed one facet of identification, it is 
possible the current measures—which tap multiple facets of identification—may not have 
picked up the psychological state we induced. Notably, that the manipulation exerted 
some effect is evidenced by the behavioral findings below.   
38 
 
 Perceptions of the other nations.  As a manipulation check for the PN 
manipulation, hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to test the effects of ID 
and PN on participants’ perceived need of others5 (M = 2.64, SD = 1.19, α = 0.86).  The 
results revealed a significant main effect of PN (β = 0.731, p < 0.001) such that 
participants in the high PN condition perceived the other two nations as in greater need of 
help than participants in the low PN condition, indicating that our PN manipulation was 
effective. The main effect of ID and the two-way interaction between ID and PN were not 
significant. 
 Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to test the effects of ID and PN 
on participants’ perception of the relationship between the United States of America and 
the other nations involved in the task (M = 3.62, SD = 0.69).  The results revealed a 
marginal main effect of ID (β = -0.085, p = 0.099), such that participants in the low ID 
condition perceived the relationship to be more positive than participants in the high ID 
condition, and a significant main effect of PN (β = -0.241, p < 0.001), such that 
participants in the low PN condition perceived the relationship to be more positive than 
participants in the high PN condition.  The two-way interaction between ID and PN was 
not significant. 
 Although the perception that the relationships between the U.S.A. and Sweden 
and Switzerland are more positive than the relationships between U.S.A. and Cambodia 
and Haiti might simply reflect reality, this difference in perception might rather be driven 
                                                        
5 The perceived need of others was measured using the average of responses on the following two 
items: “When considering the citizens of the two other nations that you participated with (excluding 
your own nation), how impoverished do you think they are?” and “When considering the citizens of 
the two other nations that you participated with (excluding your own nation), how much help do you 
think they need?”  
39 
 
by perceived racial similarity between the citizens of the former group of nations.  
Specifically, people tend to evaluate others more positively if the others are racially 
similar to themselves than if they are racially different (e.g., Ensher & Murphy, 1997); 
thus, it is possible that participants may have evaluated the relationships between the 
U.S.A. and Sweden and Switzerland more positively simply because, as in the U.S.A., 
majority of the citizens in the latter two nations are Caucasian.  This suggests that the PN 
manipulation may have been confounded by race, which may have affected participants’ 
feelings toward people from underdeveloped nations (i.e., increased disliking) as well as 
people from well-developed nations (i.e., increased liking).  Importantly, however, the 
effect of race actually works against our predictions, such that we do not expect that 
people will cooperate more with people who are racially similar (i.e., the Swedes and 
Swiss) compared to people who are racially dissimilar (i.e., Cambodians and Hatians) on 
the basis that they feel more positively about the former group of people compared to the 
latter.  Instead, we predict that despite such a possible bias, people will still be more 
inclined to act on their moral values with respect the racially dissimilar people because 
they are in greater need – but, of course, only if they identify with the ethnically diverse 
others. 
 Contributive behavior.  Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to test 
the interaction between MV (M = 3.85, SD = 0.53, α = 0.89)6, ID, and PN on participants’ 
contributions to the world account.  The results revealed a significant main effect of MV 
on contributing to the world account, β = 0.392, p < 0.001.  Specifically, MV predicted 
                                                        
6 As in Study 1, MV included PPB-SR, PPB-MMR, and MID-F.   
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global cooperation, such that people with strong MV were more likely to contribute to the 
world account as compared to people with weaker MV.  However, this main effect was 
qualified by the predicted three-way interaction between MV, ID, and PN, β = 0.101, p < 
0.05.
 7
  No other main effects or interactions were significant. 
 To decompose the three-way interaction, hierarchical regression analyses were 
conducted to test the two-way interaction between MV and ID on contributing to the 
world account within each PN condition.  As hypothesized, the results revealed a 
significant interaction between MV and ID among participants in the high PN condition 
(β = 0.154, p < 0.05) but not in the low PN condition, β = -0.046, p = 0.535 (see Figure 
2).  As expected, among participants in the high PN condition, MV weakly predicted 
contributing to the world account in the low ID condition (β = 0.226, p < 0.05), but 
strongly predicted contributing in the high ID condition (β = 0.535, p < 0.001).  The fact 
that thinking about similarities (vs. differences) with ethnically diverse others enhanced 
the value-behavior relationship is consistent with our prediction that a high perceived 
need of help is most likely to energize value-congruent behavior toward others to whom 
one feels connected. In contrast, among participants in the low PN condition, MV was 
moderately related to contributing to the world account in both the low ID condition (β = 
0.45, p < 0.001) and the high ID condition (β = 0.358, p < 0.01).  As predicted, these 
relationships did not differ from each other, indicating that identification with ethnically 
diverse others did not influence whether or not participants enacted their moral values 
                                                        
7 The three-way interactions between ID, PN, and the individual MV variables revealed the same 
pattern of effects with PPB-SR (β = 0.176, p = 0.001), PPB-MMR (β = 0.063, p = 0.209), and MID-F (β = 
0.095, p = 0.07) on participants’ contributions to the world account.   
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with international people who are perceived as low in need (and thus unlikely to activate 
moral values).  
Additionally, we tested for the difference in the correlation coefficients of MV 
and contributing to the world account between the high PN/high ID condition and the 
remaining three conditions independently.  Results revealed that the correlation 
coefficients of MV and contributing to the world account in the high PN/high ID 
condition, r(92) = 0.55, p < 0.001, and high PN/low ID condition, r(84) = 0.218, p < 
0.05, were significantly different from each other, z = 2.61, p < 0.01.  The correlation 
coefficients of MV and contributing to the world account in the high PN/high ID 
condition and low PN/high ID condition, r(78) = 0.31, p < 0.01, were marginally 
different from each other, z = 1.94, p = 0.052.  The correlation coefficients of MV and 
contributing to the world account in the high PN/high ID condition and low PN /low ID 
condition, r(98) = 0.49, p < 0.001, were not significantly different from each other, z = 
0.58, p = 0.562. 
 Overall, the results suggest that identification with ethnically diverse others does 
indeed strengthen the relationship between MV and global cooperation when interacting 
with people in great need of help; however, the identification manipulation does not have 
any effect when interacting with people in little need of help.  It appears that the 
identification manipulation used in this study was only relevant in the high PN condition 
but not in the low PN condition.  Specifically, identifying with ethnically diverse others 
was only relevant when interacting with diverse others (i.e., in the high PN condition) but 
did not exert an impact when interacting with people who were similar to the self (i.e., in 
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the low PN condition).  This may explain why we did not see the expected effects of the 
ID manipulation on identification with humanity; the ID manipulation did not necessarily 
manipulate identifying with all humans across the globe, but instead may have 
manipulated identifying with a specific group of people—i.e., ethnically and 
socioeconomically diverse others. 
 As mentioned previously, given that the ostensible participants in the low PN 
condition were from Sweden and Switzerland, which are ethnically and 
socioeconomically similar to the U.S.A., the PN manipulation was confounded by the 
pre-existing similarities with people from low PN nations.  Again, this confound does not 
undermine our prediction and finding that MV predicts increased global cooperation 
when identification with ethnically diverse others is high compared to low but only with 
people from underdeveloped nations (i.e., Cambodia and Haiti).  However, this confound 
may explain why MV was (rather surprisingly) a fairly strong predictor of global 
cooperation with people from developed nations.   
General Discussion 
 Research on social dilemmas has illustrated the effects of various personal and 
situational factors for predicting behavior in small groups, but much less is known about 
the effects of such factors in a global paradigm.  In light of the literature on morality, it is 
important to consider how varying levels of group identification may influence whether 
or not we act upon our moral values in a given situation.  In other words, though we may 
expect that certain situational cues would prompt us to act upon our values, we may only 
do so if the people we are interacting with are perceived as within our moral community.  
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 The results for Study 1 suggest that when making decisions in a moral context, 
identification with ethnically diverse others indeed encourages people to act upon their 
moral values with the global group.  As hypothesized, it appears that the level of group 
identification is indeed important for determining whether or not people will act upon 
their moral values in a morally relevant situation (i.e., moral frame condition).  On the 
other hand, when the situation is not morally relevant (i.e., economic frame condition), 
whether or not one identifies with ethnically diverse others involved is no longer 
important.  Our results for Study 2 similarly suggest that when making decisions that 
impact people who are from developing nations (i.e., high in need), identification with 
ethnically diverse others indeed encourages people to act upon their moral values with 
the global group.  On the other hand, when interacting with people from well-developed 
nations (i.e., low PN condition), whether or not one identifies with ethnically diverse 
others is no longer as important.   
 The findings of Study 1 are consistent with the idea that the moral framing 
activated a moral mindset, which motivated people to enact their moral values, but that 
enactment of values further depended on the extent to which one identified with the 
diverse global group members. In Study 2, although the manipulation of others’ 
perceived need was also intended to activate a moral mindset, it appears that the 
manipulation was confounded by the presence (or absence) of pre-existing identities.  
Specifically, identification with people from Cambodia and Haiti (i.e., high PN nations) 
may normally be relatively weak given that majority of the participants in this study were 
racially and socioeconomically different than people in said nations, thus priming 
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identification with ethnically diverse others (i.e., high ID condition) was crucial to 
encourage people to act upon their moral values.  However, identification with people 
from Sweden and Switzerland (i.e., low PN nations) may normally be relatively strong, 
particularly given that a majority of our participants were racially and socioeconomically 
similar to people from these nations.  Future research would benefit from utilizing a 
manipulation of perceived need that controls for identification or perceived similarities 
with the involved parties. 
 Relatedly, in Study 2, noticing differences between the self and ethnically diverse 
others (as in the low ID condition) may have actually made the similarities between the 
self and people from Sweden and Switzerland (as in the low PN condition) more salient, 
which may have enhanced the relationship between MV and global cooperation with the 
Swedes and Swiss.  One limitation of the ID manipulation is that although the high ID 
manipulation may have successfully primed identification with diverse others, the low ID 
manipulation may have inadvertently primed identification with people who are racially 
and socioeconomically similar.  Importantly, the group identification measures used were 
not sensitive to such differences in group identification.  Future research would benefit 
from measuring identification with people who are similar to the self separately from 
identification with people who are dissimilar along salient dimensions (e.g., race, 
socioeconomic status, culture).   
   Furthermore, given that our identification manipulation only included 
photographs of non-Caucasian ethnically diverse people, this identification manipulation 
would not be relevant to identifying with other Caucasian participants.  This may further 
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explain why the manipulation was effective in the high PN condition but not the low PN 
condition.  Specifically, identification with ethnically diverse others indeed increased 
identification with ethnic minorities—i.e., the Cambodians and Haitians (high PN 
condition), whereas such identification had no effect on identification with other 
Caucasians—i.e., the Swedish and Swiss (low PN condition).  Thus, it appears that 
identification with ethnically diverse others was simply not relevant in the low PN 
conditions and consequently had no effect.   For future research, it is important not to 
prime identification with a specific group (e.g., ethnic minorities) and instead prime 
identification with a broader international group.  Future research would benefit from 
utilizing a manipulation of identification that involves identifying with people from 
nations that are different as well as nations that are similar along salient dimensions (e.g., 
race, socioeconomic status) to the nation(s) the participants belong to. 
 Additionally, given that the sample of participants for the present studies was 
recruited via an online market (i.e., Amazon’s Mechanical Turk), the sample of 
participants is not necessarily representative of all citizens of the United States of 
America.  Thus, the effects our identification manipulation may have differed with a 
more ethnically and/or socioeconomically diverse sample of participants—e.g., for Study 
2, if the sample were more diverse, the positive relationship between MV and global 
cooperation may not have been apparent in the low PN condition given that pre-existing 
identification with the low PN nations (i.e., Sweden and Switzerland) would not be as 
strong.  Future research would further benefit from studying a much more diverse and 
representative sample of participants. 
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Furthermore, the manipulation of group identification may not have necessarily 
increased identification with ethnically diverse others.  It is possible that assimilation 
actually increased empathy for those in need of help, and it was the experience of 
compassion that motivated generous behavior.  In other words, when an individual 
assimilated the self with people who were in need, he or she may have experienced 
compassion for them without actually viewing them as part of the “ingroup”; instead, 
assimilation may have led the individual to empathize with the people in need, which 
sufficiently activated his moral values, and the individual was motivated to act upon 
those values primarily because the individual believed it was his moral responsibility to 
take care of less fortunate people.   Although we took steps to avoid priming compassion 
in our identification manipulation by utilizing photographs in which the ethnically 
diverse others appeared happy and free of suffering (e.g., children laughing, a mother 
coddling her baby), given that the people in the photographs appeared to be relatively 
impoverished and from developing nations, it is possible that this manipulation still 
primed compassion for those who are less fortunate.   
Another major limitation of the present studies is that the decision-making task 
involved playing a virtual game with little to no personal costs.  Participants completed 
an online decision-making task in which no genuine resources were at stake.  Although 
previous research suggests that personal values do indeed correlate with actual generous 
behavior—e.g., donating money to relief funds (McFarland et al., 2012)—it is possible 
that participants were more inclined to behave generously in the present studies given 
that their actual finances were not at stake.  Future research would benefit from placing 
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participants in situations in which their decisions have more imposing personal costs, 
such as if their finances or chances for a reward are at stake. 
 Relatedly, another limitation of the present studies is that the decisions of the 
ostensible participants were fixed and not reactive to the decisions of the participants.  
Although previous research has shown that participants are similarly influenced by 
others’ behavior when they are simulated and fixed (e.g., Packer et al., in prep) or 
genuine and reactive (e.g., Weber et al., 2008), it is possible that people’s behavior would 
differ depending on how others within their group responded to their own behavior.  
Furthermore, the decisions of the computer-simulated players were held constant, and the 
computer-simulated players gave to the personal, national, and world accounts on the 
same number of trials across the 12 total trials; consequently, all of the computer-
simulated players appeared impartial in their contribution decisions across the three 
accounts.  It is possible that the effect of group identification on the relationship between 
personal values and generous behavior may differ depending on the level of cooperation 
among the fellow group members.  For example, Packer et al. (in prep) found that when 
participants played a public goods game with relatively cooperative group members and 
the task was framed in moral terms, personal moral values predicted cooperation with the 
group regardless of whether or not a moral exemplar was present in the group; however, 
when participants played a public goods game with uncooperative group members and 
the task was framed in moral terms, moral values predicted cooperation with the group 
only when a moral exemplar was present and not when a moral exemplar was absent.  In 
light of this work, it would be beneficial for future research on global social dilemmas to 
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investigate whether or not people are similarly influenced by the behavior of other fellow 
players either by evaluating participants’ behavior with actual fellow participants or by 
systematically manipulating overall rates of cooperation among simulated players. 
 Overall, the results of Study 2 suggests that present contextual cues for 
identification may interact with pre-existing identities to influence how we behave 
toward certain groups, and the results of both Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate the critical role 
of group identification in determining toward whom we choose to enact our values.  
Presenting people with a morally relevant situation activates an individual’s moral values, 
but ultimately, whether or not they act upon those values in the context of a global group 
depends on whether or not they identify with members of that global community.  In 
other words, when the situation is not morally relevant, whether or not an individual 
identifies with diverse others is not relevant.  However, when the situation is morally 
relevant, the individual’s moral values become activated, and she must subsequently ask 
herself whether or not the people with whom she is interacting with are people with 
whom she wishes to enact her moral values toward; thus, her level of identification 
becomes relevant, and she only extends her generosity toward the global group if she 
identifies with them.  When it comes to the real-life social dilemma of globalization, 
simply focusing on the needs of others may not be sufficient to foster support for 
international cooperation.  Instead, we must also foster a sense of the similarities between 
ourselves and people who are seemingly distant from us.  Such a sense of connection will 
ultimately reshape our moral boundaries to include these distant others as worthy 
recipients of our generosity and cooperative efforts.    
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Study 1: Number of Allocation Decisions to the World Account as a function 
of Moral Values X Task-Framing X Identification.
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Figure 2. Study 2: Number of Allocation Decisions to the World Account as a function 
of Moral Values X Perceived Need X Identification. 
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Appendix A 
Global Public Goods Game Instructions (Study 1) 
Moral-frame condition: 
Today, you will be participating in a resource allocation task about globalization, and you 
will participate in this task with randomly selected participants from various nations who 
have also logged on to this survey. 
Globalization refers to the process of extending and enhancing social relationships 
between nations, so that goods, people and ideas flow smoothly between different 
nations.  Globalization provides nations with a history of poverty access to resources they 
could not acquire on their own.  For this reason, experts think that globalization can 
create stable prosperity in impoverished nations, and that it will help to dramatically 
improve living conditions in nations all around the world. 
As the world globalizes, people have to make decisions about how to allocate resources.  
In this task, you and other players (from your own and other nations) will make these 
sorts of decisions. 
All of the participants in this study today live in one of the following nations: Argentina, 
Bangladesh, Canada, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States of 
America.  You and participants from your nation will engage in the task with participants 
from two other randomly selected nations from the provided list.  There will be a total of 
12 players (including you) participating in this task together.  This means players from a 
total of 3 nations (including your own) will participate in this task, and each nation will 
be represented by 4 players.  You will not be told which specific nations the other players 
live in. 
 
Economic-frame condition: 
Today, you will be participating in a resource allocation task about globalization, and you 
will participate in this task with randomly selected participants from various nations who 
have also logged on to this survey. 
Globalization refers to the process of extending and enhancing economic relationships 
between nations, so that goods, services, and money flow smoothly between different 
nations.  Globalization allows nations to find new markets for their products around the 
globe.  For this reason, experts think that globalization is beneficial to nations because it 
improves their economies by dramatically expanding the customer base available to 
purchase the goods and services they produce. 
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As the world globalizes, people have to make decisions about how to allocate resources.  
In this task, you and other players (from your own and other nations) will make these 
sorts of decisions.  
All of the participants in this study today live in one of the following nations: Argentina, 
Bangladesh, Canada, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States of 
America.  You and participants from your nation will engage in the task with participants 
from two other randomly selected nations from the provided list.  There will be a total of 
12 players (including you) participating in this task together.  This means players from a 
total of 3 nations (including your own) will participate in this task, and each nation will 
be represented by 4 players.  You will not be told which specific nations the other players 
live in. 
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Appendix B 
Example trial (Studies 1 and 2) 
 
Imagine for this example, you are Player 1 in Nation A.   
Each player is allocated $100 
 
You placed your money in your personal account 
And 2 players from YOUR nation (i.e., Nation A) placed their money in your national 
account 
And 2 players from ALL nations (i.e., Nations A, B, and C) placed their money in 
the world account 
Your earnings for this round equals the money placed in your personal account PLUS a 
share from your national account PLUS a share from the world account: 
= $100 + [($100+$100) x 2 / 4] + [($100+$100) x 3 / 12]  
= $100 + $100 + $50  
= $250 
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Appendix C 
1. Prosocial Personality Battery (Penner et al., 1995) (Studies 1 and 2) 
Social Responsibility Subscale: 
You will now read a number of statements that may or may not describe YOU.  Please 
read the following statements carefully and indicate whether each statement describes 
YOU personally: 
(1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) 
 
1. If a good friend of mine wanted to injure an enemy of theirs, it would be my duty to try 
to stop them.  
2. I wouldn't feel that I had to do my part in a group project if everyone else was lazy.  
3. When people are nasty to me, I feel very little responsibility to treat them well.  
4. I would feel less bothered about leaving litter in a dirty park than in a clean one.  
5. No matter what a person has done to us, there is no excuse for taking advantage of 
them.  
6. You can't blame basically good people who are forced by their environment to be 
inconsiderate of others.  
7. No matter how much people are provoked, they are always responsible for whatever 
they do.  
8. Being upset or preoccupied does not excuse people for doing anything they would 
ordinarily avoid.  
9. As long as business people do not break laws, they should feel free to do their business 
as they see fit.  
10. Occasionally in life people find themselves in a situation in which they have 
absolutely no control over what they do to others.  
11. I would feel obligated to do a favor for someone who needed it, even though they had 
not shown gratitude for past favors.  
12. With the pressure for grades and the widespread cheating in school nowadays, the 
individual who cheats occasionally is not really as much at fault.  
13. It doesn't make much sense to be very concerned about how we act when we are sick 
and feeling miserable.  
14. If I broke a machine through mishandling, I would feel less guilty if it was already 
damaged before I used it.  
15. When you have a job to do, it is impossible to look out for everybody’s best interest.  
 
Mutual Concerns Moral Reasoning and Other-Oriented Moral Reasoning Subscales: 
You will now read a number of statements that may or may not describe YOU.  Please 
read the following statements carefully and indicate whether each statement describes 
YOU personally: 
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(1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) 
 
35. My decisions are usually based on my concern for other people.  
36. My decisions are usually based on what is the most fair and just way to act.  
37. I choose alternatives that are intended to meet everybody's needs.  
38. I choose a course of action that maximizes the help other people receive.  
39. I choose a course of action that considers the rights of all people involved. 
40. My decisions are usually based on concern for the welfare of others. 
41. My decisions are usually based on my personal principles about what is fair and 
unfair. 
42. I choose alternatives that minimize the negative consequences to other people.  
 
 
2. Moral Identification Scales (Studies 1 and 2) 
 
Fairness Subscale: 
 
Please indicate whether each statement describes you personally: 
(1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) 
 
1. The fact that I am a fair-minded person is an important part of my identity 
2. Being fair and just is an important part of my identity.  
3. I feel committed to being a fair and acting based on principles of justice.  
4. I am glad to be a person who is fair and just in his or her decisions.  
5. I think that when I act based on principles of fairness and justice I have a lot to be 
proud of.  
6. It is pleasant to act fairly and justly.  
7. Being fair and just gives me a good feeling.  
8. I think of myself as being a fair and just person.  
 
Generosity Subscale: 
Please indicate whether each statement describes you personally: 
(1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) 
 
1. The fact that I am generous and giving is an important part of my identity 
2. Being generous and giving is an important part of my identity.  
3. I feel committed to being a generous and giving person.  
4. I am glad to be a generous and giving person.  
5. I think that when I offer things to others—my time, my support—I have a lot to be 
proud of.  
6. It is pleasant to be generous and giving.  
7. Being generous and giving gives me a good feeling.  
8. I think of myself as being a generous and giving person.  
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3. Human Group Identification (Studies 1 and 2) 
Please indicate whether each statement describes you personally: 
(1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) 
 
1. I can see similarities between myself and other humans. 
2. I feel a sense of connection with all humans. 
3. I value the lives of all humans. 
4. I feel motivated to help other people. 
 
 
4. Identification with All Humanity Scale (McFarland et al., 2012) (Studies 1 and 2) 
 
How close do you feel to each of the following groups?  
(1 = not at all close, 5 = very close) 
1. People in my community 
2. Americans 
3. People all over the world 
 
How often do you use the word “we” to refer to the following groups of people?  
(1 = almost never, 5 = very often) 
4. People in my community 
5. Americans 
6. People all over the world 
 
How much would you say you have in common with the following groups? 
(1 = almost nothing in common, 5 = very much in common) 
7. People in my community 
8. Americans 
9. People all over the world 
 
Sometimes people think of those who are not a part of their immediate family as 
“family.” To what degree do you think of the following groups of people as “family?” 
(1 = not at all, 5 = very much) 
10. People in my community 
11. Americans 
12. All humans everywhere  
 
How much do you identify with (that is, feel a part of, feel love toward, have concern for) 
each of the following? 
(1 = not at all, 5 = very much) 
13. People in my community  
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14. Americans 
15. All humans everywhere  
 
How much would you say you care (feel upset, want to help) when bad things happens to: 
(1 = not at all, 5 = very much) 
16. People in my community. 
17. Americans. 
18. People anywhere in the world. 
 
How much do you want to be:  
(1 = not at all, 5 = very much) 
19. a responsible citizen of your community.  
20. a responsible American citizen. 
21. a responsible citizen of the world. 
 
How much do you believe in: 
(1 = not at all, 5 = very much) 
22. being loyal to my community. 
23. being loyal to America. 
24. being loyal to all mankind. 
 
When they are in need, how much do you want to help: 
(1 = not at all, 5 = very much) 
25. people in my community. 
26. Americans. 
27. people all over the world. 
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Appendix D 
Perceptions of other nations (Study 2) 
 
When considering the citizens of the two other nations that you participated with 
(excluding your own nation), how impoverished do you think they are? 
(1 = not at all, 5 = extremely) 
 
When considering the citizens of the two other nations that you participated with 
(excluding your own nation), how much help do you think they need? 
(1 = none, 5 = a great deal) 
 
How would you characterize the relationship between the United States of America and 
the two other nations that you participated in the Resource Allocation Task with? 
(1 = strong enemies, 5 = strong allies) 
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